The Charter of German Displaced Persons, proclaimed in Stuttgart on 5–6 August 1950, is also referred to in short as the ‘Charter of Displaced Persons’, the ‘Displaced Persons’ Charter’ or the ‘Stuttgart Charter’. The date was chosen to mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Potsdam Protocol, and Stuttgart was chosen as the venue because it was possible to organise a large-scale, high-profile event there. At the opening rally in the Kursaal in Bad Cannstatt on 5 August, attended by around 1,000 invited guests, the applause from the representatives of the displaced persons present created the impression of a quasi-plebiscitary adoption of the Charter. Also present was Vice-Chancellor Franz Blücher (FDP; 1896–1959), a member of the Federal Government;^[1] the occupying powers were represented by political officials from the High Commissions of the USA and France. On 6 August, again in the presence of prominent political guests, including Federal Minister for Displaced Persons Hans Lukaschek (CDU; 1885–1960), a large rally took place in front of the ruins of Stuttgart’s New Palace, attended by approximately 100,000 people, at which the proclamation of the Charter was repeated. The event concluded with the signing of the Charter by representatives of the Central Association of Displaced Germans (ZvD) and the United East German Associations (VOL), both precursors to today’s Federation of Displaced Persons (BdV), at a reception hosted by the state government of Württemberg-Baden at Villa Reitzenstein. Across the political spectrum, leading politicians of the Federal Republic – such as Helmut Kohl (1930–2017), Roman Herzog (1934–2017), Otto Schily, Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel, have repeatedly emphasised the Charter’s contribution to Germany’s reconciliation with its eastern neighbours. For the BdV and its member associations, too, it forms a key foundation of their identity.

An analysis of the origins and historical impact of the Charter that fully meets academic standards remains, to this day, a gap in the literature. All that is available are general overviews, the vast majority of which belong less to academic discourse than to historical and journalistic discourse. Particularly noteworthy here is Ralph Giordano’s book *Die zweite Schuld oder On the Burden of Being German*(The Second Guilt), published in 1987, in which he makes a sharp settlement with the Charter. He describes it as “a classic example of historical obfuscation”. It severs any causal link between cause and effect, ignores the chronology of events, and thus conceals the background to the expulsion; in doing so, it contributes to the repression and denial of the first guilt and makes itself a unique example of the second.”^[2] Giordano’s criticisms have since been repeatedly echoed by other authors and, in some cases, further intensified. Of particular note is Micha Brumlik, who described the Charter as “a corporatist, ethno-nationalist founding document, imbued with a spirit of revenge, self-pity and historical distortion – a spirit all the stronger for its supposed renunciation.”^[3] Furthermore, Brumlik refers, citing the journalist Erich Später,^[4] that a third of the Charter’s original signatories were committed National Socialists. Später states, amongst other things, that half of the 30 signatories to the Charter were not displaced persons, but rather “Nazi officials and activists”, whose biographies were representative of German officials responsible for displaced persons. However, Später largely fails to provide conclusive evidence for this thesis; rather, he implicitly downplays it by referring to it as his “assessment” and points to a lack of relevant research findings.^[5] In Poland, critical views of the Charter have so far predominated.^[6] It is viewed positively by the US international law expert Alfred M. de Zayas^[7] and the political scientist Marion Frantzioch-Immenkeppel. In 1999, the latter described it as a “prime example of political culture” and a remarkable “document renouncing the use of force”.^[8] In 2003, historians Jürgen Danyel and Christoph Klessmann placed the Charter, along with the Tübingen Memorandum, the EKD’s ‘Eastern Memorandum’, the correspondence between the Polish and German bishops, and the Bensberg Memorandum, within the context of reconciliation initiatives between Germany and its eastern neighbours.^[9]

It is no coincidence that, immediately after the founding of ZvD and VOL, the two organisations came together for the purpose of proclaiming the Charter. The aim was to gloss over the differences that had become openly apparent between the two competing umbrella organisations by presenting a powerful united front, and to position themselves as key players in the political system of the still-young Federal Republic. As early as 20 November 1949, ZvD and VOL had agreed in the Göttingen Agreement to “set out their common demands and objectives in a Magna Charta^[10] of the Displaced Persons’”. In February 1950, a committee with equal representation from both organisations was formed for this purpose; due to irreconcilable differences, it was soon expanded into a broader commission. This body drafted the text of the Charter, which was in many respects a compromise, as it was necessary to reconcile the highly heterogeneous views – including those based on religious and ideological grounds – held by the ZvD and VOL, and within these organisations themselves.

The main aims of the Stuttgart Charter were, firstly, to link the displaced persons’ demands regarding homeland policy – namely the right to return and the revision of borders – with a solemn ‘renunciation of revenge and retribution’ and the goal of European unity. Secondly, the displaced persons wished to express their right to political participation and to formulate demands regarding the pressing issues of integration. As a political signal, the Charter was therefore by no means directed solely outwards, but also – and above all – inwards.

Critics often complain that the Charter does not explicitly address German responsibility for the Second World War. Whilst this observation is correct, one must not underestimate the significance of the Stuttgart gesture, given that it originated from a group of victims whose deeply traumatic experiences lay only a few years in the past. The call to renounce revenge and retribution first appeared explicitly in 1948 within the Sudeten German Ackermanngemeinde; it is therefore ultimately motivated by Christian principles. From today’s perspective, and given the scale of the crimes committed by the Nazis, it is particularly difficult to comprehend the statement: ‘The peoples of the world should recognise their shared responsibility for the fate of the expellees, who were the hardest hit by the suffering of that era.’ This almost autistic view of things can be explained by the contemporary discourse on victimhood, as it was part of the fundamental consensus on the politics of remembrance in the early Federal Republic to see itself as an innocent victim. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that, within West Germany, the displaced persons found themselves in a situation of ‘victim competition’ with other German war victims, in which it was essential to distinguish themselves. In this respect, such statements already foreshadow the fierce disputes over the sharing of the burden.

The proclamation of the Charter of the German Displaced Persons was a significant prestige victory for the displaced persons’ associations. For the first time, they had made their voices heard prominently and expressed their claim to be serious players in the new democracy. A key factor in the Charter’s wider impact was that the political elites of the young Federal Republic, across party lines, identified with the text. Even though, with the benefit of hindsight more than 60 years on, some of the wording may seem jarring today, and the demand for return and the right to one’s homeland stands in clear tension with the goal of integration, the Charter of the German Expellees can nevertheless be described as a remarkable historical document, which records the expellees’ desire for integration and their willingness to seek reconciliation with Germany’s eastern neighbours.

• Ralph Giordano: The Second Guilt, or On the Burden of Being German. Hamburg 1987 (Police + Research, special edition).
• Michael Schwartz: Officials with a Past. The Founding Executive Committee of the Federal Association of Displaced Persons and the ‘Third Reich’. Munich 2013.
• Matthias Stickler: Opponents of Reconciliation? The Stance of Expellees’ Associations on German–Polish Understanding from 1949 to 1969. In: Friedhelm Boll, Wiesław Wysocki, Klaus Ziemer (eds.), Thomas Roth (contributor): Reconciliation and Politics. Polish–German Reconciliation Initiatives of the 1960s and the Policy of Détente. Bonn 2009 (Archive for Social History, Supplement 27), pp. 224–244. Translation into Polish: Opponents of reconciliation? The stance of the associations of displaced persons towards the Polish–German agreement in the years 1949–1969. In: Friedhelm Boll, Wiesław J. Wysocki, Klaus Ziemer (eds.), Thomas Roth (contributor): Reconciliation and Politics. Polish–German Reconciliation Initiatives in the 1960s and the Policy of Détente. Warsaw 2010, pp. 201–220].
• Matthias Stickler: “We, the displaced persons, renounce revenge and retribution” – The Stuttgart Charter of 5–6 August 1950 as a historical document. In: Jörg-Dieter Gauger, Hanns-Jürgen Küsters (eds.): “A Sign of Humanity and the Will to Reconciliation”. 60 Years of the Charter of the Displaced Persons. Sankt Augustin 2011 (A publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation e. V.), pp. 43–74. Available online at: www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22454-544-1-30.pdf?110406114811 (last accessed 23 July 2021).

• www.hdg.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest_erklaerungChartaDerHeimatvertriebenen/index.html

Matthias Stickler: Charter of the German Expellees. In: Online Encyclopaedia on the Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe, 2012. URL: ome-lexikon.uni-oldenburg.de/p32842 (as at 23 July 2021).