Ukraine
Etymology
‘Ukraina’ first appears as a regional name in East Slavic chronicles of the 12th and 13th centuries, referring to the border regions of the Kyiv Rus’. The name is derived from the Old Slavic word ‘kraj’ (edge, border region). From the 16th century onwards, it was used to refer to the area around the middle Dnieper (Ukrainian: Dnipro; Russian: Dnepr), particularly in connection with the Cossacks living there.
The term ‘Ruthenians’ for Ukrainians living in the Habsburg Monarchy is still found in Carpathian Ukraine as ‘Rusyn’. ‘Little Russia’ (Malorossija) was the official term used in the Russian Empire to refer to the Ukrainian territories following the annexation of the Hetmanate of the Dnieper Cossacks, as opposed to ‘Great Rus’ in the north-east. Originally, in the 14th century, the Patriarch of Constantinople had referred to the dioceses in the south-west as ‘Little Rus’.
Location
Ukraine, situated between 22° and 40° east longitude and 45° and 52° north latitude, is the second-largest country in Europe after the Russian Federation, with an area of 603,700 square kilometres. It shares land borders with Belarus, Poland, Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia and the Russian Federation. The length of Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline is 1,355 kilometres.
Topography
Ukraine’s most important river is the Dnieper, which, at 2,201 kilometres in length, is the third-longest river in Europe. It divides Ukraine into ‘Left-Bank Ukraine’ and ‘Right-Bank Ukraine’. Whilst the majority of the land is flat or consists of gentle hills, the Carpathian Mountains, with peaks reaching up to 2,000 metres, form a barrier. The Crimean Mountains reach altitudes of up to 1,500 metres. Extensive forests are found mainly in the north. The highly fertile black earth is found in the forest-steppe zone in the south and south-east of the country.
Historical Geography
Ukraine’s current national borders are identical to those of the intra-Soviet federal borders. The western border dates back to the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference from 4 to 11 February 1945, in which the Western powers granted the USSR the territories east of the so-called ‘Curzon Line’: Poland was required to cedeWestern Volhynia andEastern Galicia; Romania,Southern Bessarabia andNorthern Bukovina; Czechoslovakia, Carpathian Ukraine; and Hungary, two counties with a Ukrainian majority population. In 1948, Romania ceded the small Snake Island in the Black Sea to the USSR, and its status as part of Ukraine was confirmed by treaty in 1997. In 1954, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to assign the Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, through whose territory logistical supplies to the peninsula were routed. In 2014, a border change took place following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, which is not legitimate under international law.
Despite the repeated state-orchestrated population transfers throughout the 20th century (including the Polish–Ukrainian population exchange in 1944, the deportation of the Ukrainian-German population from the eastern territories in 1941, and that of the Crimean Tatars and other peoples in 1944) and the murder of a large proportion of the Jewish population during the Holocaust, Ukraine is today a multi-ethnic state: Alongside the Ukrainian majority, the population consists primarily of Russians, Moldovans and many other ethnic groups (see table). The Russian-speaking population lives mainly in the eastern regions – Donetsk/Donets’k, Luhansk/Lugansk, Kharkiv/Kharkov – but also in the south. The Ukrainian diaspora now lives mainly in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, as well as in the USA and Canada, in South America and in a number of European countries.
Ukraine and Ukrainians: The pre-national phase
The preamble to the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine refers to a “history spanning many centuries of the formation of the Ukrainian state”[1]. Historically speaking, however, it was only Ukraine’s independence, proclaimed in 1991, that proved to be enduring. The foundations of its cultural identity, shaped by the adoption of Christianity from Byzantium, date back to the East Slavic realm of Kievan Rus’ (10th–13th centuries). Other historical centres of power on Ukrainian territory include the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, which managed to retain a degree of autonomy during the period of Mongol rule over Rus’ (1237–1480). At the same time, cultural exchange with Western European countries began here through dynastic ties and trade. Furthermore, under the Polish–Lithuanian Empire, into which the East Slavic–Ruthenian-inhabited areas were incorporated, a process of increased Westernisation took place. Following the Partitions of Poland–Lithuania in 1772 and 1795, these territories were taken over by the Habsburg Monarchy.
In 1654, following the Treaty of Andrusovo, the Cossack Hetmanate in the central Dnieper region submitted to the Russian Tsar; a renewed Cossack state never came into being. At the same time, from the 17th century onwards, it can be assumed that an East Slavic differentiation into Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian ethnic groups took place. The national movement amongst the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire on the one hand, and within the Habsburg Empire – centred on Galicia – on the other, was driven primarily by scholarly circles, intellectuals and Greek Catholic priests. This did not give rise to a mass movement that would have also encompassed the peasant population.
The First World War and the Ukrainian bourgeois states
Whilst Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, for example, were able to establish their own states in the wake of the First World War, this attempt by the Ukrainians stalled at the very outset. The military weakness of the Ukrainian People’s Republic under the Central Assembly (Central’na Rada, March 1917 – April 1918), the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky (April – November 1918) and the Directory (from December 1918, merged in January 1919 with the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, which had existed in Galicia since November 1918) – in the face of a superior force of domestic and foreign interventionist troops and irregular militias, dependence on the Central Powers—who had been defeated in the World War—and the hesitant mobilisation of national forces reduced their ability to assert themselves from the outset. The Bolshevik government, established in Kharkiv in 1917, commanded the more powerful troops and ultimately assumed control of the country, which had been ravaged by civil war, anarchy and famine. In 1921, following the Polish–Soviet War, the bourgeois governments came to an end. Nevertheless, they remain a point of reference in the nation’s collective memory today, particularly against the backdrop of the subsequent Soviet rule. For the next few decades, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, proclaimed in January 1919, played a defining role; in 1922, it became one of the founding members of the USSR and thus transferred extensive powers over its domestic and foreign policy to the central authorities in Moscow/Moskva.
The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Soviet rule did indeed bring about the territorial unification of all the major areas inhabited by Ukrainians, particularly as a result of the Soviet expansion westwards after the Second World War, and it provided Ukrainians with career opportunities within the system. At the same time, however, social groups persecuted as anti-Soviet (e.g. kulaks, Ukrainian nationalists, clergy and others), as well as the elites – who were in any case only weakly established – were subjected to repression.
In the 1920s, the fledgling Soviet government attempted to bind the nationalities to the Soviet Union through cultural promotion and to recruit Soviet cadres from among them. For Ukraine, this policy of ‘rooting’ (Russian: korenizacija), introduced in 1923, meant, amongst other things, the strengthening of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian National Communists such as the Commissars for Public Education, Oleksandr Šums’kyj (1890–1946) and Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933), were willing implementers of Moscow’s directives. However, the – already limited – influence of Ukrainian politicians on Soviet directives diminished further as Stalin’s (1878–1953), General Secretary of the Party’s Central Committee since 1922, grew increasingly fearful that national forces posed a threat to the system. The ‘revolution from above’ he initiated – involving the forced collectivisation of agriculture and accelerated industrialisation from the late 1920s onwards – was accompanied by a purge of Ukrainian national communists. These immense social upheavals were exacerbated by the devastating famine (Holodomor, literally: ‘death by starvation’) of 1932–33. Triggered by a crop failure and exacerbated by grain exports by the Soviet government – which, for propaganda reasons, denied the existence of the famine abroad – this resulted in millions of deaths in Ukraine (as insouthern Russia). The number of those who starved to death can only be estimated approximately: Western historians put the figure at around six million victims of starvation in the European Soviet Union, more than half of whom were ethnic Ukrainians,[2] Ukrainian historians put the death toll in Ukraine at just under four million, though some estimates reach as high as ten million.[3]
The theory that the catastrophe was deliberately caused by Moscow in order to wipe out the Ukrainian population is espoused primarily by Ukrainian historians, but is open to criticism for several reasons:[4] The famine extended far beyond Ukraine, affecting regions such asWestern Siberia, the southern Urals,Northern Kazakhstan, the Northern Caucasus, the Kuban and the Volga region, where it also affected Russians and other nationalities. Furthermore, its impact was not evenly distributed across Ukraine, where the death toll from starvation increased from west to east. Nevertheless, in addition to Ukraine, several other states recognise the mass deaths as ‘genocide against the Ukrainians’; in 2008, the European Parliament described the ‘Holodomor (the deliberately induced famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine) as a terrible crime against the Ukrainian people and against humanity.’[5]
The nationwide Stalinist purges and the Great Terror of 1936–1938, which were initiated by a crackdown on ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ from 1933 onwards, were overseen in Ukraine from 1938 by Nikita Khrushchev (Khrushchev, 1894–1971) as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (CP). Almost the entire political leadership in Kyiv fell victim to the purges of 1936–1938: in addition to the Politburo, the Organisational Bureau and the Office of the Party’s Central Committee, this included the 17 People’s Commissars of Ukraine. Of the 102 members of the Central Committee (CC) and candidates, only three survived their arrest. However, it is difficult to calculate the total number of Stalinist victims in Ukraine because the sources are too fragmented and the term ‘victim’ is often not further differentiated in statistics. Furthermore, the victims include not only those who died as a result of direct acts of terror, such as executions by firing squad, but also those who perished as a result of measures such as imprisonment in camps, during deportation or whilst en route to camps, and during the recurring famines.[6]
Ukraine’s fate during the Second World War was largely determined by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 (the Hitler–Stalin Pact): Following the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, the Red Army marched into eastern Poland on 17 September 1939 and occupiedEastern Galicia. This was followed by the first steps towards Sovietisation, until the German Wehrmacht launched ‘Operation Barbarossa’ and the attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a terrorist and nationalist group, took advantage of this and proclaimed a Ukrainian ‘state’ in Lemberg/L’viv/Lwów on 30 June 1941. The endeavour failed after just a few days due to German opposition. The German plans, on the other hand, envisaged the division of Ukraine into four territories administered differently: The western Ukrainian territories became the Galicia District of the General Government; the territories in the south between the Bug (Buh) and Dniester (Dnestr) rivers were transferred to Romanian administration as ‘Transnistria’; and the areas of Chernivtsi/Černivci/Cernăuţi and Ismaїl were also assigned to Romania, whilst central Ukraine formed the ‘Reich Commissariat of Ukraine’ on 1 September 1941. The civilian occupation regime did not provide for any right of participation for the local population; rather, it involved their deportation as ‘Eastern workers’ to the Reich – the majority of these labour slaves from Eastern Europe were Ukrainian women – as well as the exploitation of the country’s raw materials, with the result that famine was widespread. An estimated 1.4 million Jews living in occupied Ukraine fell victim to the Holocaust.[7] The murder of a large proportion of Kyiv’s Jewish population at Babi Yar near (now in) Kyiv constituted the largest mass shooting of the Holocaust; a member of SS Action Group C reported that on 29 and 30 September 1941 alone, a total of 33,771 Jews had been killed.[8] The reign of terror under the Nazi occupation was particularly evident in the more than 300 Jewish ghettos, the approximately 300 forced-labour camps and the prisoner-of-war camps, whose inmates often perished of starvation. Day-to-day life under the occupation was further characterised by food rationing, the constant threat of being deported as ‘Eastern workers’, and German reprisals and the execution of hostages following partisan attacks.
The Red Army’s recapture of Ukraine in 1943 was followed by the re-establishment of the Soviet regime and the settlement of scores with Nazi collaborators and those who were declared as such on the basis of fabricated evidence: repatriated ‘Eastern workers’ and prisoners of war, as well as Ukrainians and Russians who had served in the Wehrmacht or the civilian occupation authorities, and the underground fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Western Ukraine – which was to be Sovietised – who continued to harass the Red Army until 1946. The number of Ukrainian inmates in Soviet penal camps rose from 107,550 Ukrainians (out of a total of 1,703,095 prisoners) in 1946 to 506,221 out of a total of 2,528,146 Ukrainians in 1951.[9]
Stalin’s dictatorship came to an end with his death in 1953. The subsequent period up to 1964 – Khrushchev’s term as First Secretary of the Party in Moscow – brought political détente to Ukraine. For the first time, Ukrainian dissidents organised themselves in secret; initially they sought a relaxation of the socialist cultural dogma, but then, in the wake of the Helsinki human rights movement, they pressed for the rule of law and democratisation. However, they never became a mass movement; their numbers remained modest. Many Ukrainian opposition figures were sentenced to prison terms on political grounds or committed to psychiatric hospitals.
In the year before Khrushchev’s downfall in 1964, Petro Šelest (1908–1996; 1963–1972) was appointed Party Secretary in Kyiv, where he pursued a cautious ‘Ukrainian course’. His replacement by the hardliner Volodymyr Shcherbitzky (Ščerbic’kyj, 1918–1990; 1972–1989) resulted in increased alignment with Moscow and Russification, which even the ‘perestroika’ of the party’s new General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev (Gorbačev), refused to accept. It was only the traumatic events of the Chernobyl/Čornobyl’ nuclear disaster on 26 April 1986 and the shock felt by the Ukrainian and Soviet populations at the authorities’ inaction that brought about a rethinking of policy. During this period, civil society associations and groups advocating democratisation also began to form; in 1989, strikes took place in the coal mines of the Donbas (Russian: Donbass), during which the strikers initially pursued social and subsequently political objectives. The ‘People’s Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika’ (Narodynj ruchUkraïny za perebudovu), or ‘Ruch’ for short, founded in 1989, played an important role in the democratisation process. The anti-Soviet protest movement in Ukraine gained a momentum of its own through its national component, which ultimately aimed at state independence. In September 1989, Ščerbic’kyj, along with other politicians in the Ukrainian republic’s leadership who were resistant to reform, was removed from office by Moscow. On 16 July 1990, the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verchovna Rada Ukraïny) declared Ukraine’s state sovereignty. Although the Soviet Union lost an important economic base as a result of Ukraine’s secession, Moscow did not oppose this, but insisted on the handover of nuclear weapons and a guarantee regarding the use of the naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea.
Ukraine since 1991
The people of Ukraine endorsed the Ukrainian Parliament’s declaration of state independence of 24 August 1991 in a plebiscite held on 1 December 1991 by an overwhelming majority of 90.3 per cent, which means that the national minorities, including the Russian population, also largely supported Ukrainian statehood.[10] However, the transition from a one-party system and a centrally planned economy to a multi-party system and a market economy was a slow and arduous process. Under the first two post-Soviet presidents, Leonid Kravchuk (Kravčuk, born 1934; 1991–1994) and Leonid Kuchma (Kučma, born 1938; 1994–2005), neither a change of elite in politics and the economy nor the urgently needed modernisation of enterprises or lustration (the removal of politically compromised staff) in the administration and judiciary was achieved. Corruption in everyday areas such as road traffic, the school and higher education systems, and public administration, as well as pressure on the free press – which could even lead to physical elimination – caused general dissatisfaction to grow. This discontent culminated in the Orange Revolution of 2004–05, which, backed by a relatively broad-based civil society movement, after months of protest in freezing winter temperatures, helped the ‘Orange’ presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko (born 1954) – who stood for the country’s European integration – into office. However, his reform efforts aimed at democratisation came to nothing, particularly as the Orange forces became divided. This handed his rival, Viktor Yanukovych (Yanukovyč, born 1950), a golden opportunity to secure victory in the subsequent presidential election. Although democratically elected, he led the country back into autocracy; press freedom was once again curtailed, the judiciary was exploited for political ends, arbitrary action by the authorities increased, and parliament was misused as a compliant tool. The general standard of living stabilised at a low level. In the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine ranked 142nd out of 175 countries surveyed.[11]
When the government led by Prime Minister Mykola Azarov (born 1947; 2010–2014) postponed the signing of the EU Association Agreement indefinitely on 21 November 2013, this triggered a widespread protest movement, the ‘Euromaidan’. Starting in Kyiv, where several tens of thousands of citizens had initially gathered from November 2013 onwards, supporters of the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ soon emerged across the country[12]. Violence on the Maidan in Kyiv escalated when, from 20 January 2014, snipers opened fire on the crowd, killing around 100 people. Under mounting pressure from the streets, Yanukovych decided to flee (as he had planned) to Russia. This led to his removal from office by the Kyiv parliament. In the presidential election on 25 May 2014, Petro Poroshenko (born 1965; 2014–2019) became the first candidate to be elected representing the whole of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, regions with large Russian-speaking populations were thrown into turmoil. Following a dubious referendum and the infiltration of soldiers without insignia into Crimea, the peninsula was annexed by Russia on 21 March 2014. In Donetsk and Luhansk, insurgents – supported more or less openly by Moscow – established pseudo-states with the aim of seceding these ‘People’s Republics’ from Ukraine. The war being waged in these areas – referred to in Ukraine as the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation)) – between regular and paramilitary Ukrainian units and heavily armed separatists has so far claimed several thousand lives, and has resulted in widespread fear amongst the affected civilian population and flows of internally displaced persons numbering in the millions. It is destabilising Ukraine in its efforts to advance democratisation. At two summit meetings in Belarus, France and Germany attempted to mediate between Ukraine on the one hand and Russia and the separatists on the other. However, the negotiations, which culminated in two agreements – ‘Minsk I’ of 5 September 2014 and ‘Minsk II’ of 12 February 2015 – failed to prevent the establishment of pseudo-state structures in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Driven by disappointment at the failure of public reforms and the continued rule of corrupt elites, the political newcomer Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Zelens’kyj, born 1958) emerged victorious in the run-off of the 2019 presidential election. He is thus the seventh president since 1991 to have come to office through a democratically legitimate transition of power. This is remarkable when compared with Belarus, where Aleksandr Lukashenko (Lukašenko) has ruled continuously since 1991, and with the Russian Federation, where, following President Boris Yeltsin (El’cin), President Vladimir Putin has held office since 2000 – with a one-off swap of roles with Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2012 – and, following the 2020 constitutional amendment, has the option of standing for re-election multiple times.
Kyiv continues to pursue a course of rapprochement with the EU. The section of an Association Agreement governing political and economic cooperation was signed by Poroshenko, or rather the interim government, in March and May 2014. A deeper effect of the ongoing state of war in Ukraine is that the population’s willingness to help, patriotism and civil mobilisation are developing into an integrative force within society that did not exist in previous decades.
Ethnic minorities/Germans in Ukraine
For many years, Ukraine’s multi-ethnic composition was not a source of domestic political discord. According to the census, over 130 ethnic groups lived in Ukraine in 2001:
Population size and composition of Ukraine according to the first national census of 2001[13]
| Absolute figures (in thousands) | Percentage 2001 | Percentage 1989 | ||
| Ukrainians | 37.541.7 | 77.8 | 72.7 | |
| Russians | 8.334.1 | 17.3 | 22.1 | |
| Belarusians | 275.8 | 0.6 | 0.9 | |
| Moldovans | 258.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | |
| Crimean Tatars | 248.2 | 0.5 | 0.0 | |
| Bulgarians | 204.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | |
| Hungarians | 156.6 | 0.3 | 0.4 | |
| Romanians | 151.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | |
| Poland | 144.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | |
| Juden | 103.6 | 0.2 | 0.9 | |
| Armenians | 99.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 | |
| Greeks | 91.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | |
| Tatars | 73.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | |
| Roma | 47.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | |
| Azerbaijani | 45.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | |
| Georgians | 34.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | |
| Germans | 33.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | |
| Gagauz | 31.9 | 0.1 | 0.1 | |
| Other nationalities | 177.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
The majority of the population are ethnic Ukrainians, accounting for almost 78 per cent in 2001. In the years prior to 1989, their number increased by 0.3 per cent and their share of the total population rose by 5.1 percentage points. Russians rank second. Compared with 1989, their proportion fell by 26.6 per cent, their share of the total population decreased by 4.8 percentage points and stood at 17.3 per cent in 2001.
In this breakdown, the German minority is scarcely noticeable in terms of numbers. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, it holds cultural significance in the settlement areas of Volhynia, the Black Sea coast, the Crimea, Galicia and Bukovina. On the one hand, German settlers contributed to the colonisation of southern Ukraine in particular. On the other hand, in modern times, several Ukrainian towns were granted Magdeburg city rights, including Lviv and Kyiv. This led to the expansion and development of urban institutions, the likes of which did not exist in regions further to the east.
The spread of Lutheranism amongst the Ukrainians in Galicia—which can still be found there today—was also fostered by the former German settlements. In the Catholic sphere, it is worth noting that Alexander Frison (1875–1935) was one of four bishops secretly consecrated in 1926 on a papal mission to the USSR. Following repeated arrests during the Stalinist terror, Frison was shot in prison in 1937.[14]
During the Soviet era, the fate of the Ukrainians of German descent was marked by numerous upheavals. During the 1920s, not only was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Volga Germans established, but a number of German raions were also founded across the Union, ten of which were in Ukraine. Here, German became the official language and was promoted, within the limits permitted by the ideology, through cultural institutions such as theatres, libraries and the press, as well as through schools, universities and technical colleges. Following the gradual phasing out of these concessions to national minorities, the collectivisation of agriculture, driven through under Stalin, hit the Germans particularly hard, as the majority of them were farmers who made their living from agriculture. During Stalin’s ‘Great Terror’, minorities in particular found themselves in the crosshairs of the mass persecution of alleged ‘anti-Soviet elements’. Many Germans fell victim to the ‘German Operation’ of 1937–38 because, particularly after Hitler’s seizure of power, they were regarded as potential internal enemies.[15] Following the German Reich’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, as a result of the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 28 August 1941 on the‘resettlement of the Volga Germans’, , 82,900 Germans from Ukraine were also deported in several waves to Soviet special settlements inWestern Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Altai.[16]
In the German-occupied territories of Ukraine, the Ukrainian-German population – which, in the SS’s assessment, was of poor ‘German racial stock’[17] , was instead educated and indoctrinated so that they might assume future leadership roles. The‘ethnic Germans’were also given preferential treatment when it came to food rations. They were granted tax exemptions, whilst the Slavic population – deemed ‘inferior’ under Nazi racial theory – was in some areas starving. Partly because the Soviet kolkhozes continued to operate, disappointment and passivity spread amongst the Germans in the Reich Commissariat for Ukraine (RKU). Whilst Germans from the Reich were primarily recruited for roles within the considerable administrative apparatus, Ukrainian Germans were also actively persuaded to collaborate with the occupying forces. Young Ukrainian-Germans familiar with the local area took part, as members of the ‘Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz’ (Ethnic German Self-Defence), in the shooting of tens of thousands of people, primarily Jews.[18] One example of this is the mass shooting of Jews in December 1941/January 1942 near Nikolaev/Mykolaїv, in which 60 men from the ‘Self-Defence’ in Transnistria took part.[19] One motive was the prospect of plundering Jewish property; furthermore, participation in mass murders was intended to secure the‘ethnic Germans’a share in the Nazi order by proving their loyalty to it and thereby gaining structural economic advantages.[20] The ‘ethnic German’ collaborators were not anti-Semites from the outset, but they became so through their involvement in the Holocaust and through the ongoing Nazi propaganda during the occupation.[21] Further efforts are needed to situate these crimes within the broader narrative of Germans with Eastern European roots in the present day, as well as to address their historiographical analysis.[22]
The Nazi German resettlement policy, on the one hand, and the Soviet deportations, on the other, brought an end to the more or less enclosed German settlements in Ukraine. The Germans fromWestern Volhynia were transferred to the Reichsgau Wartheland and other areas in 1939–40; in 1943, some 90,000Eastern Volhynian Germans from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine followed.[23] As early as 1942, the German occupation authorities resettled various groups, each comprising several thousand ‘ethnic Germans’, from zones close to the front line in occupied Ukraine to the safety of the rear. The administrative, de facto refugee-like resettlement of Germans from the territories occupied in the Soviet Union, which was carried out from October 1943 onwards and was to end in the Wartheland and the General Government, comprised three ‘trecks’, initially 72,000 Germans, the majority from Kherson, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, Melitopol and Mariupol, as well as from the Crimea; then 73,000 Germans from the north-eastern Black Sea region and southern Ukraine; and 135,000 Germans from Transnistria. As the Red Army advanced westwards, troops of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD) rounded up the‘ethnic Germans’who had remained behind, who were collectively regarded as collaborators.[24] Even for receiving food rations during the war, they faced prison sentences lasting several years.
They were followed by Germans from the Soviet Union who had fled to Germany during the war (including Germans from Carpathian Ukraine, which became part of the Soviet Union in 1944), who were forcibly repatriated to the USSR after the Second World War as Soviet and Soviet-Ukrainian citizens. They shared the post-war fate of most Germans in Ukraine: forced resettlement in special settlements in Siberia and Kazakhstan, from which they were not released until 1955. They were denied the right to return to their former settlements. It was not until the late 1980s that they were permitted to openly voice national demands and also their wish to emigrate to Germany as (late) resettlers.
Although minority rights were enshrined in law in post-Soviet Ukraine, the Germans still living there are dissatisfied with how these rights are implemented in practice. The current military conflict in the country has also caused concern amongst the German community, affecting in particular the Germans still living in Crimea – numbering several hundred.[25]
Bibliography
The question of a Ukrainian national identity has been, and continues to be, a major theme in fiction. Prophetic and heroic roles, extending far beyond the act of storytelling, have been attributed to – or imposed upon – writers. Even today, they enjoy ‘a certain cult status’[26].
In the 18th century, Ukrainian was established as a written language by the philosopher Hryhorij Skovoroda (1722–1794). The poet Taras Shevchenko (Ševčenko, 1814–1861) is regarded as the true founder of the Ukrainian literary language. The fact that he was exiled by the Russian Tsar and banned from writing only served to cement his status as the Ukrainian national poet and hero of freedom. Since 1939, Kyiv State University has been named after him. The city of Ivano-Frankivsk, known as Stanislau until 1962, owes its present name to the poet, playwright and prose writer Ivan Franko (1856–1916).
Authors of various native languages lived in regions that now form part of Ukraine. Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) was born in Velyki Soročynci and repeatedly drew on motifs from Ukrainian folklore in his Russian-language works. Mikhail Bulgakov (1891–1940; his work *The Master and Margarita* [‘Master i Margarita’] is considered a masterpiece of European stature) witnessed the numerous changes of rule in his native city of Kyiv amidst the turmoil of the revolution and civil war, and immortalised them in ‘The White Guard’. The Polish writer Bruno Schulz (1892–1942) lived in Drohobych, Galicia, where he was shot dead by an SS soldier. The Russian-speaking journalist and writer Isaak Babel (1894–1940) was born in Odessa/Odesa. As one of the many victims of Stalinist terror, he was arrested, tortured and killed. Also from Odessa were the Russian-speaking satirical duo Ilya Ilf (1897–1937) and Yevgeny Kataev (known as Yevgeny Petrov, 1903–1942). Joseph Roth (1894–1939), an Austrian writer, came from Brody in Eastern Galicia. The Polish science fiction author Stanisław Lem (1921–2006) lived in Lviv until 1946. Paul Celan (1920–1970) and Rose Ausländer (1901–1988) met in the ghetto of Czernowitz/Černivci/Cernăuţi.
During the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, Yuri Andrukhovych (Andruchovyč, born 1960) gained the widest international recognition among Ukrainian-language authors through his poems, essays and novels that contrast the pre-Soviet and Soviet past with the post-Soviet present, he gained the greatest international recognition amongst Ukrainian-language authors. Among the authors writing in Russian in Ukraine is Andrei Kurkov (born 1961). His novels (‘Picnic on the Ice’, ‘The President’s Last Love’) recount, in a style that is partly realistic and partly fantastical, the eccentricities of post-Soviet society in a state of upheaval.
Poets such as Tymofij Havryliv (b. 1971) and Mykola Rjabčuk (b. 1953) explore the legacy of the Austro-Hungarian era in multi-ethnic Galicia, as well as the associated mythologisation of that period. Oksana Sabuschko (Zabužko, born 1961) has made a name for herself through her poetry and novels. The glorification of the nationalist Nazi collaborator and partisan Stepan Bandera (1909–1959) and his comrades-in-arms, which she undertakes in the novel *Museum of Forgotten Secrets*, speaks to the tensions and divisions in the way 20th-century Ukrainian history – and the Second World War in particular – is dealt with.
The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have been themes in literature since 2014. The poet, musician and translator Serhij Zhadan (Žadan, born 1974) places the war at the centre of his fictional works *Boarding School* and ‘Why I’m Not Online: Poems from the War’, as well as in his feature articles (e.g. ‘The Army: That’s Us Too’), and in doing so explores the emergence of a new heroic archetype.
Bibliography
- Anne Applebaum: *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine*. Munich 2019.
- Melanie Arndt: Children of Chernobyl. The Transnational History of a Nuclear Disaster. Göttingen 2020.
- Katrin Boeckh: Stalinism in Ukraine: The Reconstruction of the Soviet System after the Second World War. Wiesbaden 2007.
- Katrin Boeckh, Ekkehard Völkl: Ukraine. From the Red to the Orange Revolution. Regensburg 2007.
- Katrin Boeckh, Oleh Turij (eds.): Religious Plurality as a Political Factor in Ukraine. Munich et al. 2015.
- Ingmar Bredies (ed.): On the Anatomy of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. A Change of Elite Regime or a Triumph of Parliamentarism? Stuttgart 2005.
- ČChornobyl’s’ke dos’je KGB. Vid construction to avariї. Collection of documents on the disaster on Čornobyl’’s’kij AES [The Čornobyl’dossier of the KGB. From its construction to the accident. A collection of documents on the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station]. Kyiv 2020.
- Frank Golczewski: Germans and Ukrainians 1914–1939. Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich 2010.
- Jaroslav J. Hrycak: An Outline of the History of Ukraine: The Formation of Modern Ukrainianї naciї XIX–XX st. [An Outline of the History of Ukraine. The Formation of the Modern Ukrainian Nation in the 19th–20th Centuries]. Kyїv 1996.
- Raïsa P. Ivančenko: Istorija bez mifiv. Besidy z istoriї Ukraїns’koї deržavnosti [History without Myths. Conversations on the History of Ukrainian Statehood]. 2nd ed. Kyїv 2006.
- Kerstin S. Jobst: The Pearl of the Empire. The Russian Discourse on Crimea in the Tsarist Empire. Konstanz 2007.
- Kerstin S. Jobst: History of Ukraine. 2nd, updated and expanded edition. Stuttgart 2015.
- Kerstin S. Jobst: A History of the Crimea. Iphigenia and Putin in Tauris, Berlin, Munich, Boston 2020.
- Andreas Kappeler (ed.): Ukraine: Processes of Nation-Building. Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 2011.
- Andreas Kappeler: A Brief History of Ukraine. 4th revised and updated edition. Munich 2014.
- Ivan P. Kryp-jakevyč: Istorija Ukraїny [History of Ukraine]. L’viv 1992.
- Robert Paul Magocsi: A History of Ukraine. 3rd ed. Seattle 1998.
- Isydor Nahajevs’kyj: Istorija ukraїns’koї deržavy dvadcjatoho stolittja [History of the Ukrainian State in the Twentieth Century]. Kyїv 1994.
- Olena Novikova, Oleksandr Pronkevyč, Leonid Rudnyc’kyj, Ulrich Schweier (eds.): Ukraine and Ukrainian Identity in Europe: Contributions to an Assessment of Position through Language, Literature and Culture. Munich 2017.
- Tanja Penter: Coal for Stalin and Hitler. Work and Life in the Donbas 1929 to 1953. Essen 2010.
- Heiko Pleines: Ukrainian Networks. Informal Influence in Ukrainian Economic Policy 1992–2004. Münster 2005.
- Serhii Plokhy: Ukraine and Russia. Representations of the Past. Toronto 2008.
- Serhii Plokhy: Chernobyl. The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe, New York 2018.
- Winfried Schneider-Deters: Ukraine: A Power Vacuum between Russia and the European Union. Berlin 2012.
- Gerhard Simon (ed.): The New Ukraine. Society – Economy – Politics. Cologne 2002.
- Orest Subtelny: Ukraine. A History. 4th ed. Toronto 2009.
- Ricarda Vulpius: The Nationalisation of Religion. Russification Policy and Ukrainian Nation-Building 1860–1920. Wiesbaden 2005.
- Karin Warter, Alois Woldan (eds.): A Second Attempt. Ukrainian Literature Today. Passau 2004.
- Andrew Wilson: The Ukrainians: An Unexpected Nation. 3rd ed. New Haven 2009.
- Serhy Yekelchyk: Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation. New York 2007.
- Serhy Yekelchyk: The Conflict in Ukraine. What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford 2015.
Periodicals
- East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 2014 onwards.
- Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 1973 onwards.
- Ukraїns’kyj istoryčnyj zurnal [Ukrainian Historical Journal], 1957 onwards.
- Ukraїns’kyj istoryk: žurnal istoriï i ukraïnoznavstva [The Ukrainian Historian: Journal of History and Ukrainian Studies], 1963 onwards.
- From the archives of the VUČK, GPU, NKVD, KGB: Scientific and Documentary Journal, 1994 onwards.
Web links
- izbornyk.org.ua/ (Electronic library on the history of Ukraine from the 9th to the 18th century [sources and interpretations])
- gis.huri.harvard.edu/ (The Mapa: Digital Atlas of Ukraine by the Harvard Ukrainian Institute)
- www.laender-analysen.de/ukraine/ (Reports on the politics, economy and culture of Ukraine, published by the Centre for Eastern European Studies at the University of Bremen and the German Society for Eastern European Studies)
- www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/ (Online encyclopaedia of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies)
- history.vn.ua/ (Textbooks, books and teaching materials on the history of Ukraine)
- www.history.org.ua/?litera&sendBigAsk&year=kvinta&isInst=1&siteBibKat=З&main (Books and textbooks on the history of Ukraine)
- archives.gov.ua/en/digitization-of-archives-on-the-history-of-the-holocaust-and-the-nazi-occupation-of-ukraine/ (Archival sources on the Second World War and the Holocaust in Ukraine)
- euro-maidan.info/ (Coverage of the EuroMaidan)
- www.memorialmuseums.org/laender/view/26/Ukraine (Memorial portal on places of remembrance in Europe – Ukraine)
Notes
[1] The Constitution of Ukraine in Ukrainian, English and German: www.verfassungen.net/ua/verf96-i.htm (accessed 7 July 2020).
[2] Stephan Merl: Was the famine of 1932–1933 a consequence of the forced collectivisation of agriculture, or was it deliberately brought about as part of ethnic policy? In: Guido Hausmann, Andreas Kappeler (eds.): Ukraine: The Present and History of a New State. Baden-Baden 1993, pp. 145–166, here p. 147.
[3] Anne Applebaum: *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine*. Munich 2019, p. 440.
[4] Merl: Was the Famine of 1932–1933 a Consequence of Forced Collectivisation, and Stefan Merl: Did Stalin Instigate the Famine of 1932–1933 to Eradicate Ukrainian Nationalism? In: Yearbooks for the History of Eastern Europe 37 (1989), No. 4, pp. 569–590.
[5] The European Parliament’s resolution on its official website: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0523+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE (accessed 7 July 2020).
[6] See, amongst others, *Polityčnyj teror i teroryzm v Ukraїni. XIX–XX st. Istoryčni narysy* [Political Terror and Terrorism in Ukraine. 19th–20th Centuries. Historical Sketches]. Kyїv 2002.
[7] Dieter Pohl: ‘The Theatre of Operations: Ukraine – The Mass Murder of Jews in the Military Administrative District and the Reich Commissariat, 1941–1943’. In: Norbert Frei, Sybille Steinbacher, Bernd C. Wagner (eds.): ‘Exploitation, Extermination, Public Opinion. New Studies on Nazi Camp Policy. Munich 2000, pp. 135–173, here p. 169.
[8] Hartmut Rüss: Kiev/Babi Yar 1941. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Places of Horror. Crimes during the Second World War. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 102–113, here p. 102.
[9] Ukraine: The Second Half of the 20th Century. Outlines of History. Kyiv 1997, p. 4.
[10] Bohdan Harasymiw: Post-Communist Ukraine. Edmonton 2002, pp. 8–9.
[11]www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2014/results (accessed 7 July 2020).
[12] Yaroslav Hrytsak: ‘Revolution of Dignity’. In: Claudia Dathe, Andreas Rostek (eds.): Maidan! Ukraine, Europe. Berlin 2014, pp. 72–78.
[13] State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine: 2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/nationality/ (accessed 7 July 2020).
[14] For background, see the source collection: Katrin Boeckh, Emília Hrabovec (eds.), KonNetz: Confessional Networks of Germans in Russia 1922–1941. Source database. With the collaboration of Steffi Keil. (konnetz.ios-regensburg.de/about.php).
[15] See also the collection of documents: “Bol’šoj terror” v Ukraine: nemeckaja operacija 1937–1938 gg. [The “Great Terror” in Ukraine: The German Operation of 1937–1938]. Edited by: Alfred Eisfeld, Andrij Kogut, Sergij Kokin, Otto Luchterhandt, Iryna Ljabach, Natalija Serdjuk, Joachim Tauber. Kyiv 2018.
[16] Barbara Dietz, Peter Hilkes: Russian Germans: Strangers in the East. History. Situation. Future Prospects. 2nd ed. Munich 1993; Eisfeld, Martynenko, ‘Filtration and Operational Registration’, pp. 123–130.
[17] Adapted from: Benjamin Pinkus, Ingeborg Fleischhauer: The Germans in the Soviet Union. History of a National Minority in the 20th Century. Baden-Baden 1987, pp. 267–268.
[18] Pohl: The Ukraine Theatre, p. 168.
[19] Eric C. Steinhart: The Holocaust and the Germanisation of Ukraine. Cambridge 2015.
[20] Steinhart: *The Holocaust and the Germanisation*, pp. 226–229, p. 236.
[21] Steinhart: *The Holocaust and the Germanisation*, p. 236.
[22] Hans-Christian Petersen: ‘Selective Memory. The Second World War in Ukraine in the Historical Memory of Russian Germans’. In: *Holocaust-Studies: A Ukrainian Focus*. Special Issue, *Dnipro* 11 (2020), pp. 191–220.
Online: English version: www.duhk.org/fileadmin/data_duhk/documents/2020_HOLOCAUST_STUDIES_11_Eng.pdf, German version: www.duhk.org/fileadmin/data_duhk/documents/2019_HOLOCAUST_STUDIES_11_Ukr_Germ.pdf, downloads of individual articles: www.hsuf-journal.com.ua/index.php/hsuf/issue/view/3; Dmytro Myeshkov: The Germans in Ukraine during the Occupation 1941–1944. In: Burkhard Olschowsky, Ingo Loose (eds.): National Socialism and Regional Identity in Eastern Europe. Ideology, Expansion of Power, Persistence. Munich 2016, pp. 401–423.
[23] Ortfried Kotzian: The Resettlers. The Germans from Western Volhynia, Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Dobruja and the Carpathian Ukraine. Munich 2005, pp. 54–61.
[24] Alfred Eisfeld, Vladimir Martynenko: ‘Filtration and Operational Registration of Ethnic Germans in Ukraine by the Ministry of the Interior and State Security during the Second World War and in the Post-War Period’. In: Nordost-Archive. Journal of Regional History. New Series. 21 (2012), Lüneburg 2013, pp. 104–181, here p. 155.
[25] Karsten Kammholz: Concerns about the German minority in Ukraine. In: Die Welt, 24 March 2014. URL: www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article126106942/Sorge-um-deutsche-Minderheit-in-der-Ukraine.html (accessed 27 August 2019).
[26] Warter in Warter/Woldan 2004, p. 7.
Citation
Katrin Boeckh: Ukraine. In: Online Encyclopaedia on the Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe, 2020. URL: ome-lexikon.uni-oldenburg.de/p32641 (accessed 30 November 2020).
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