Germany/German Empire

1. Toponymy

German name

Germany/German Empire

Official name

North German Confederation (1867–1871), German Empire (1871–1945 or – in the form of the government assumed by the victorious powers – until 1949), 1943–1945 also the Greater German Reich

Unofficial designations: (German) Empire or Second Reich (1871–1918), Weimar Republic (1918–1933), ‘Third Reich’ or Nazi Germany (1933–1945)

Etymology

The name ‘Deutschland’, meaning ‘land of the Germans’, is derived from the Early New High German word ‘diutisk’ (‘belonging to the people’, Latinised as ‘theodiscus’), which was used to denote the Germanic vernacular language(s) as distinct from Latin, the language of learning and administration used at that time in the Frankish Kingdom or the East Frankish Kingdom. Over time, these older forms gave rise to the adjective ‘teutsch’ (at times erroneously associated with the ancient Teutonic tribe) or ‘German’, and, by analogy, the country name ‘Teutschland’ or ‘Deutschland’. Against the backdrop of a growing early national consciousness, this term referred primarily to the German-speaking regions of the Holy Roman Empire (which, from the late 15th century, bore the suffix ‘Deutscher Nation’).

2. Geography

Location

The German Empire – bearing in mind that, under international law, its identity is the same as that of the present-day Federal Republic of Germany – formed the main part of (north-)western Central Europe. It was bounded to the north-west by the North Sea, to the north-east by the Baltic Sea, to the south-west by the Vosges, to the south by the Alps, and to the south-east by the Bavarian Forest and the Bohemian Forest, as well as by the Ore Mountains and the northern Sudeten Mountains (the Giant Mountains). There were no natural borders to the west and east; to the west, the western edge of the Rhenish Slate Mountains could, to a certain extent, be regarded as such. Until 1920, Germany’s neighbouring countries were Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary. Following the reorganisation after the First World War, the latter two powers were replaced by Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and (German)Austria. As a result of the annexations during the Nazi era, the Reich temporarily bordered Slovakia between 1938 and 1945, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia (and also – provided one regards the dissolution of Poland in 1939 as a fait accompli – the Soviet Union). As a result of the loss of its eastern territories after the Second World War – which was initially provisional in accordance with the Potsdam Decisions of August 1945 and became definitive under international law through the German–Polish Border Treaty of 1990 – Germany lost its direct neighbourly relationship with Lithuania.

Topography

Irrespective of the territorial changes that took place during the 20th century, Germany is characterised by a topographical division that runs primarily from north to south: In the north, beginning with the coastal areas along the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, the North German or Central European lowlands merge seamlessly into the similar landscapes of the Netherlands, Denmark (Jutland) and – today – Poland (Pomerania andLower Silesia). Historically, it extended further via Hinterpommern to West and East Prussia and into the Warta–Vistula region around Posen/Poznań. This lowland area encompasses the entire Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Bremen, Hamburg, Brandenburg and Berlin, as well as parts of Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony. To the west, the lowland plain extends as far as the Westphalian and Cologne basins; to the east, as far as the Leipzig Basin and Upper Lusatia. To the south, this gives way to the low mountain range region, which characterises the majority of central and southern Germany; this applies in particular to the states of Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Thuringia, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. The northern section of this region is formed by the German Low Mountain Range, which comprises primarily the Rhenish Slate Mountains (Teutoburg Forest, Rothaar Mountains, Eifel, Westerwald, Hunsrück, Taunus), the Lower Saxony–Hesse Uplands (Rhön, Vogelsberg), the Harz, the Thuringian Forest, the Franconian Forest, the Ore Mountains and, in the south-east, the Bavarian Forest; until 1945, this zone extended eastwards into the Silesian Giant Mountains and the Sudeten Mountains. To the south of the Low Mountain Range, in the far west, lie the Saar-Nahe region and the Palatinate. To the east, this is followed by the Upper Rhine Plain, which runs mainly through the region of Alsace (France) as well as Baden and the Palatinate, and extends northwards into the Rhine-Main region and the Wetterau. As a result of the air masses flowing northwards from the Mediterranean region via the Rhône basin, the Upper Rhine Valley is the warmest part of Germany in climatic terms. To the east of it lies the South-West German Escarpment; this includes the Odenwald and Spessart in the north, the Black Forest in the south-west, and the Swabian and Franconian Alb in the east. To the south of the Danube lies the Alpine foothills, the southernmost – and by far the smallest – major topographical region, which transitions into high mountains in the far south, on the border with Austria, in the Allgäu and the Bavarian Alps.

Historical Geography

The territorial structure of the German Empire took shape in two stages: Firstly, in 1867, following Prussia’s victory in the German Confederation War and Austria’s withdrawal from German politics, 22 states north of the Main River united under Prussian leadership to form the North German Confederation (Constitution of 16 April 1867). Several German states were annexed by Prussia (Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, the Free City of Frankfurt am Main). The former federal state of Luxembourg, together with the federal fortress located there, withdrew from the Confederation following a Prussian-French agreement and became fully sovereign. Later, following the joint victory over France, the southern German states of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden (as well as Hesse-Darmstadt for its territories south of the Main) joined the North German Confederation in November 1870; this subsequently took the name ‘German Empire’ (the proclamation of the Emperor at the Palace of Versailles on 18 January 1871 was primarily of a symbolic nature). On 16 April 1871, the Empire adopted a new constitution. Its territory was expanded through the annexation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, ceded by France under the Treaty of Frankfurt of 10 May 1871; these became the ‘Reichsland of Alsace-Lorraine’ and were not granted a constitution – and thus elevated to the status of a federal state – until 1911. Between 1871 and 1920 (when the Treaty of Versailles came into force), the territory of the German Empire covered 540,858 km². The overseas colonies, which were not part of the actual German territory, covered a total area of 2,658,450 km² in 1914.

As a result of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, Germany’s territory was reduced to 468,116 km² in 1920. The following territories were lost:

- Alsace-Lorraine (area 14,522 km²): The territory was placed under French administration without negotiation as early as the Armistice of 11 November 1918, but was not formally ceded until the Treaty of Versailles.

- Eupen-Malmedy, including Neutral-Moresnet (area 1,036 km²): This almost entirely German-speaking region was transferred to Belgium without a referendum as compensation for damage caused during the period of German occupation.

- North Schleswig (area 3,993 km²): This area (known as Zone I) was annexed to Denmark on 15 June 1920 following the referendum of 10 February 1920, whilst the southern Zone II remained part of Germany. The plebiscite was officially legitimised as the belated implementation of a provision of the 1866 Treaty of Vienna between Prussia and Austria. However, the Danish side was favoured by the fact that Zone I, where a clear decision in favour of Denmark was expected, was allocated in its entirety to the state chosen by the majority, whilst in the predominantly pro-German Zone II, the allocation was made on a district-by-district basis.

- The province of Posen, which had becomePrussian as a result of the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century , was ceded to Poland without a vote, with the exception of a few German-populated districts in the west and south; the ceded area amounted to 26,000 km².

- The majority of the former Prussian province of West Prussia, with the exception of Danzig/Gdańsk and the administrative district of Marienwerder/Kwidzyn – which, following the plebiscite of 11 July 1920, remained part of Germany and was incorporated into the province of East Prussia (as the ‘Administrative District of West Prussia’) – passed to Poland without a referendum. The area ceded amounted to 17,750 km².

- The Soldau area (south-western East Prussia) was transferred to Poland without a referendum; area: 500 km².

- The Hultschin region/Hlučínsko/Kraik hulczyński ( Upper Silesia) was transferred to Czechoslovakia without a referendum; the area covered 330 km².

- Eastern Upper Silesia (area 3,241 km²): Following the referendum held on 20 March 1921, in which approximately 60 per cent of those eligible to vote had voted for Germany and approximately 40 per cent for Poland, the relevant League of Nations commission decided to to divide the territory in accordance with a provision set out in the Treaty of Versailles. This decision, as well as the demarcation of the border – which resulted in the majority of the coal mines and industrial facilities lying within Polish territory – reflected the preference shown, particularly by France, for its Polish ally. Although a border demarcation more favourable to Germany had initially been envisaged, Polish armed groups attempted, during the third of the Silesian Uprisings (2 May – 5 July 1921; the other two having taken place in 1919 and 1920), to enforce Poland’s far-reaching territorial claims by force. The Allied troops stationed there to maintain order offered little resistance; however, the ‘Upper Silesian Self-Defence Force’, formed from Freikorps units, pushed back the Polish units, particularly during the Battle of St Ann’s Mountain/Góra Świętej Anny ( 21–27 May 1921). The final demarcation of the border largely corresponded to Polish wishes. Nevertheless, the German–Polish Agreement on Upper Silesia, concluded in Geneva on 15 May 1922 for a period of 15 years, guaranteed important protective rights for national minorities on both sides.

- In 1919, Danzig and its surrounding area, covering an area of 1,966 km², were declared the ‘Free City’ under the protection of the League of Nations. However, the Polish state, which had laid claim to Danzig even though only around five per cent of its inhabitants were Polish, was granted extensive economic and military rights within this newly created state (particularly in its port) and represented it externally, whilst the German Empire, as the mother country of 95 per cent of Danzig’s population, lost all sovereign rights in the city.

At that time, the following came under League of Nations administration:

- the Saar region (Saarland; area 1,910 km²) from 1920 to 1935 (de facto under French occupation). France attempted to bring the region under its economic, political and cultural control; however, in accordance with the result of the referendum held on 13 January 1935 (over 90 per cent in favour of Germany), it was returned in full to the Reich on 1 March of the same year.

- the Memel region (Memelland; area 2,848 km²) from 1920 to 1923 (also under French occupation). It was occupied in 1923 in a surprise raid by Lithuanian units and subsequently incorporated into Lithuania; the League of Nations approved this action. On 22 March 1939, following an ultimatum issued by the German Reich to Lithuania, the Memel region once again became German territory.

The Rhineland, including several bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Rhine, was occupied by the Western Powers from 1918 to 1930 and declared a demilitarised zone under the Treaty of Versailles (including a 50-kilometre-wide strip on the eastern bank), but remained German territory throughout. This measure served primarily as a means of securing German reparations payments. Following the signing of the Treaties of Locarno in 1925, the occupation – which could have lasted until 1935 at the latest – was gradually lifted from 1926 onwards and – following the signing of the Young Plan, which was intended to settle the reparations payments once and for all – brought to an end on 30 June 1930. In 1922, the parts of Posen and West Prussia bordering other Prussian provinces to the west, which remained part of Germany, were combined to form the new province of Grenzmark Posen-West Prussia, with its capital at Schneidemühl/Piła (area 7,695 km²). It existed until 1938, when it was dissolved and its districts were incorporated into the surrounding provinces of Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia.

Following the Nazi regime’s seizure of power in 1933, numerous territorial changes took place, initially through peaceful means and, from 1939, by military force. The return of the Saarland to German sovereignty in 1935 and the so-called remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 – that is, the re-establishment of German military structures in this region, which had been demilitarised under the Locarno Treaties – did not , strictly speaking, constitute territorial expansions. Such territorial expansions, however, did occur with the annexation of Austria (‘Anschluss’) on 13 March 1938 and with the annexation of the predominantly German-inhabited areas of Czechoslovakia (‘the Sudetenland’) following the Munich Agreement concluded on 29 September 1938 between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. Whilst these still constituted demands for territorial revision that could be justified on ethnographic grounds from the German side, the occupation of the so-called ‘remainder of Bohemia’ and the subsequent proclamation ofthe “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”as part of the Greater German Reich on 15 March 1939 marked an expansion beyond the German settlement area and the beginning of a geostrategically motivated policy of expansion. After the outbreak of war in September 1939, subsequent territorial policy became complex and depended on the specific political objectives in each respective area. Immediately following the invasion of Poland, the Free City of Danzig was reintegrated into the Reich on 1 September 1939; shortly afterwards, on 26 October 1939, it was merged, together with the territory of the Polish Voivodeship of (Greater)Pomerania (Województwo Wielkie Pomorze, since 1938) and the East Prussian administrative district of West Prussia, to form the Reichsgau Danzig-West Prussia. On the same day, the Reichsgau Posen (renamed the Reichsgau Wartheland from January 1940) was established on the territory of the former Greater Poland Voivodeship (Województwo Wielkopolskie). The Reichsgaus were regarded as Reich territory directly subordinate to the Reich leadership (represented by the Reich governors), and thus without even a formal regional level; the NSDAP party districts, which were established to correspond exactly with these areas, were of great importance for the political and administrative integration of these territories. The status of the General Government, which was also established on 26 October 1939 from the remaining German-occupied Polish territories, remained unclear. It was not annexed, and its temporary designation as a ‘neighbouring territory of the Reich’ provided no clear constitutional definition. The civil authorities under Governor-General Hans Frank (1900–1946) operated in what was effectively a legal vacuum, where neither international law nor the informal conventions that were at least partially observed in occupied Western Europe applied. For this reason, and in view of the nature of Nazi occupation policy, the General Government could be described as a ‘semi-autonomous colonial territory’.

As indicated, a different approach was taken with regard to the territories on the western border that were occupied following the Western Campaign in May/June 1940. Whilst Eupen-Malmedy, which had been ceded to Belgium in 1919, was annexed, Luxembourg, (German) Lorraine and Alsace were initially placed under German civil administration only (so-called CdZ territories, ‘Head of Civil Administration’); this was linked to Hitler’s (1889–1945) intention to treat his Western European opponents relatively leniently and to keep his options open regarding alliances. At the same time, these territories were incorporated into the NSDAP’s expanded Gau structure: Eupen-Malmedy into the Gau Cologne-Aachen, Luxembourg into the Gau Moselland, Lorraine into the Gau Westmark (together with the Saarland and the Palatinate) and Alsace into the Gau Baden, or from then on the Gau Baden-Alsace. The long-term plan was to convert the Westmark and Baden-Alsace Gaus into Reichsgaue (in the case of Baden-Alsace, as the ‘Reichsgau Upper Rhine’); however, this did not come to pass by 1945. Following the victory over Yugoslavia in April 1941, the CdZ territories of Carinthia and Carniola – formerly part of Austria – bordering the Reich, as well as Lower Styria, were established; these were also earmarked for subsequent annexation. The Bialystok/Białystok district, formed from former Polish and Belarusian territory following the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, constituted a special case. Administratively, it was placed under the authority of the Gau of East Prussia and constituted the only CdZ territory within the Eastern Front; preparations for its full incorporation into the Reich were systematically carried out until the German retreat in the summer of 1944.

The German defeat in the Second World War in 1945 led not only to the loss of all territorial gains made since 1938, but also to the occupation of the whole of Germany and the loss of the eastern territories within the 1937 borders. By early 1945, the advancing Soviet forces and the Polish units accompanying them had occupied the provinces of East Prussia, West Prussia (including Danzig), Pomerania and Silesia up to the Oder–Neisse line; they began to expel the German population who had not yet fled and declared the occupied German territories to be Soviet or Polish national territory. These unilateral claims – which were turned into faits accomplis through the establishment of Polish and Soviet military and civilian structures, as well as through resettlement measures – were invalid under international law. A formal interim solution was reached at the Potsdam Conference (17 July – 2 August 1945), at which the Western Powers accepted the placement of the German eastern territories under Soviet or Polish administrative sovereignty; this included consent to the ‘orderly and humane transfer’ of the Germans still remaining east of the Oder and Neisse rivers to the remaining German territory. This arrangement did not constitute recognition under international law of the Oder–Neisse line as Poland’s western border, as the final demarcation of the border was to be reserved for a general peace conference, which never took place as a result of the Cold War. The GDR’s recognition of the border in the Görlitz Agreement of 6 July 1950 was rejected by the Federal Republic as illegitimate. With the declaration of renunciation of the use of force in the Warsaw Treaty of 9 December 1970 and in the CSCE Helsinki Final Act signed on 1 August 1975, the Oder–Neisse border was de facto recognised by the Federal Republic, even though this did not yet imply a definitive relinquishment of territory. This, and thus the final settlement under international law, was only achieved after German reunification in the German–Polish Border Treaty of 14 November 1990, which had been laid down as binding in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty of 12 September 1990. The status of northern East Prussia (as Kaliningradskaya oblast’), which was conquered by the Red Army in 1945, as part of the Soviet Union or Russia is not based on any comparable provision under international law; following the decision in the Potsdam Agreement to place the territory under Soviet administration, it was annexed on 17 October 1945. By defining the territory of a united Germany as comprising the territories of the Federal Republic, the GDR and Berlin in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty (whereby the question of the continued existence of the Reich within its 1937 borders was no longer discussed), the two German states implicitly recognised this status quo in 1990. Memel was incorporated into the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1945 and has been part of the Republic of Lithuania since 1991.

In the West, too, following 1945 – apart from the return of Alsace-Lorraine to French control – there were cessions of German territory to neighbouring states, albeit for the most part only temporary. As it had done after the First World War, France once again attempted to secure the Saarland for itself; to this end, it pushed for its separation from the French occupation zone in 1946 and for the adoption of a separate Saarland constitution in 1947. De facto, the region was controlled politically and economically by France. Under the terms of the Paris Treaties, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) was prepared in 1954 to negotiate the so-called (second) Saar Statute with France, which would have ‘Europeanised’ the Saarland until the conclusion of a peace treaty – in effect, permanently removing it from the German federal system. However, this option was rejected by two-thirds of the Saarland population in a referendum on 23 October 1955; consequently, the region became the tenth Federal State of the Federal Republic of Germany on 1 January 1957. Also initiated by France was the Ruhr Statute of 1949, which provided for joint control of the West German coal and steel industries by the Western Powers and the Federal Republic, which was then in the process of being established. Initially, as in the case of the Saar, France sought to separate the region from Germany; however, the USA and the United Kingdom opposed this on the grounds of economic reconstruction. The Ruhr Statute was replaced in 1951 by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Benelux countries also attempted, after 1945, to secure compensation for the German occupation through territorial cessions. Whilst Belgium and Luxembourg asserted only minor, largely symbolic claims to German border districts, the Netherlands made territorial claims along the shared border covering an area of approximately 1,840 km², which included, amongst others, Borkum, East Frisia, the Emsland, the County of Bentheim and parts of the cities of Osnabrück, Münster, Aachen and Cologne. Here, too, political pressure from the major Western powers ensured that the Federal Republic – which was needed as an ally – was spared more severe losses; as a result, after 1949, only territories totalling approximately 70 km² came under so-called Dutch mandated administration, which did not constitute annexation. In 1963, these territories, with the exception of a few very small strips of land, were returned to Germany. Belgium had already returned all its occupied territories in 1958 – including a territorial exchange – whilst Luxembourg did so in 1959.

3. History and Culture

The Road to the Founding of the German Empire (1806–1871)

Following the end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, brought about by Napoleon (1769–1821), the German states—which were then nominally sovereign—divided into, on the one hand, the members of the Confederation of the Rhine, which was directly subordinate to France, and, on the other, the powers of Austria and Prussia, which were formally allied with Napoleon on an equal footing. In the course of the Wars of Liberation from 1813 to 1815, Napoleon’s German vassal states did indeed break away from him one after the other; however, they insisted on their autonomy and rejected the idea of German unification. The German Confederation, founded in 1815, indirectly continued the imperial tradition, but did so explicitly within a European framework and on the basis of the monarchical principle. Whilst one of the Confederation’s primary aims was initially to suppress nationalist and liberal aspirations in Germany, by 1848–49 it had become the legal and political basis for the attempt to re-establish a democratic empire. A key factor in this was the shift in the concept of the empire from a universalist, supranational interpretation to a national one centred on the German people. This process, driven primarily by bourgeois circles, had already begun in the late 17th and 18th centuries in the wake of the secession of most non-German territories from the Holy Roman Empire, and was completed in the second half of the 19th century.

The integration of the German Confederation into the political strategy of Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) was essential to the ultimate success of German unification, as it made it possible to free Prussian policy from the stigma of particularist power-seeking and to rally the bourgeois public in Prussia and the other German states behind Bismarck. At the same time, the experiences of 1848–49 had shown that unification would only be possible with the consent of the other great powers and/or through armed conflict against them. The scepticism of the Liberals – who were strongly represented in the Prussian Landtag after 1860 – towards the ‘authoritarian modernisation’ pursued under the New Course and the power-politics-driven unification policy in Germany was expressed above all in the well-known military conflict. Ultimately, Bismarck was only able to resolve this conflict in his favour as a result of the successes he had achieved. The popular joint campaign by Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864 illustrated for the first time this rapprochement between the bourgeoisie and the civil-military state authority, which was still predominantly led by the aristocracy. The ‘moral victories’ Bismarck had hoped for did indeed benefit Prussia above all, whilst the incompatibility between the Habsburgs’ dynastic interests and the quest for German national unification became increasingly apparent. An important factor in foreign policy was that, whilst England and Russia closely monitored developments in the German Confederation from the perspective of maintaining stability, they accepted Bismarck’s assurances that his policies would realise the Germans’ right to national unity in a form that would also accommodate the security interests of the other powers. In any case, in Saint Petersburg/Saint-Pétersbourg/Leningrad and London, the France of Napoleon III (1808–1873) was generally perceived as the disruptive factor.

The Prussian victory in the German War of 1866 led to Austria’s definitive withdrawal from German politics and to the ‘Small German’ solution, initially in the form of the North German Confederation, founded in 1867. On the domestic front, this was accompanied by a split within the Liberal Party between the majority, which organised itself as the National Liberals – who granted Bismarck immunity in 1866 and intended to support him (at least) until German unification was achieved – and the Old Liberals, who remained in opposition and were consequently marginalised for a long time. The South German states that had remained independent – Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt – having lost Austria as their protective power – concluded defensive ‘alliances of protection and defence’ with Prussia in the face of French threats to the German unification process; these provided for their troops to be placed under Prussian supreme command in the event of war. In July 1870, following France’s declaration of war on Prussia, the alliance was invoked, culminating in the joint victory of all German states in 1871. Even before the peace treaty with France was concluded, the German Empire was founded in November 1870, with effect from 1 January 1871, following the accession of the South German states to the North German Confederation.

The Central and Eastern European dimension of the founding of the German Empire

In 1807, Prussia – which had been defeated by Napoleon – owed its – albeit reduced – continued existence largely to the intervention of Tsar Alexander I (Aleksandr I, 1777–1825), who wished to establish a buffer between the Russian Empire and expansionist France. The Prussian–Russian alliance concluded against Napoleon in 1813 contributed significantly to the salvation of the Hohenzollern state, but after 1815 also led to Prussia’s long-term dependence on Russia, as the country had been exhausted by the French occupation and the burdens of war. Within the German Confederation, Austria once again assumed the leadership of the German states. ‘Third Germany’ was primarily concerned with maintaining its position vis-à-vis the two great powers, and continued to maintain close ties with France and Western Europe. In Prussia, the memory of the country’s reconquest from the east cemented the special status of East Prussia, with its coronation city of Königsberg/Kaliningrad and the other old Prussian provinces. In Prussian domestic politics, the ‘Polish question’ took on increasing significance, even though the territory acquired from the Partitions of Poland in 1815 had been greatly reduced. In the provinces of Posen and West Prussia, it was initially the Polish nobility who, encouraged by the preceding phase of the Duchy of Warsaw created by Napoleon, sought to regain their position as the ruling class in a Polish state. Consequently, the social and functional privileges offered by the king were not enough for them; rather, they supported the uprisings in Russian Poland in 1830–31 and 1863–64 and also hatched corresponding plans within Prussia, for example in 1846.

The revolution that broke out in 1848 revealed the conflicting interests of Germans and Poles in the Prussian eastern territories, which lay hidden behind the slogan of ‘friendship among nations’—a slogan based, amongst other things, on their shared rejection of Russian policy. The Poles attempted to gain exclusive control over the Province of Posen, to the detriment of Germans and Jews; their military uprising was crushed by Prussian troops. The resulting shift away from the ‘enthusiasm for Poland’ of the Vormärz period was also evident in the proceedings of the German National Assembly at St Paul’s Church in Frankfurt; from then on, German and Polish national interests were to appear to many as irreconcilable. Against the backdrop of a shift from a primarily emancipatory form of nationalism to an integral and geopolitical one, the Liberals’ alignment with the Prussian government’s line took place in the 1870s, partly for reasons of strategic security. Russia’s – more or less – benevolent neutrality proved to be an important factor in Bismarck’s political strategy. In addition to the close ties between the two dynasties, Russian displeasure at Austria’s intervention on behalf of the Western powers in the Crimean War also played a part. These factors, together with the assurances mentioned, prompted the Tsar to accept the ‘revolutionary’ aspects of Bismarck’s policy, namely the mobilisation of the bourgeois public and the deposition of friendly ruling houses. Russia remained neutral in 1866 and, in 1870, prevented Austria from intervening on France’s behalf through unequivocal threats. In 1871, the Second Reich replaced the German Confederation – which, as a zone of European equilibrium, was openly exposed to foreign influences – with a sovereign nation state that took Prussia’s place as an equal member of the concert of powers.

The German Empire (1871–1918)

In terms of domestic policy, the German Empire represented a compromise between the values and interests of the princes on the one hand – who, through their representatives in the Bundestag, remained the nominal holders of sovereignty – and those of the bourgeoisie on the other. The latter played a decisive role in shaping the dynamic development of the new nation state in the fields of the economy, science, culture and education, whilst at the same time fostering a culture of political debate and decision-making within the Reichstag that continually pushed back the de facto limits of parliamentary power within the constitutional monarchy. The integration of the working class – which was essential to economic development – became the primary social task; its political arm, the SPD, gradually moved towards a reformist course and, by 1912, had become the largest parliamentary group in the Reichstag. As a result, the Reich presented the often contradictory image of a country that was outwardly traditionalist and still dominated by the nobility, yet was modern at heart and, in many respects, at the forefront of general European development; in this respect, it resembled Great Britain and other Western and Northern European monarchies. Owing to the growing ethno-cultural concept of the nation, national and ethnic minorities (including Poles, Danes, Alsatians and Lorrainers) came under increased pressure to assimilate. The main structural problems of the Empire, however, were, on the one hand, the contrast between the industrial regions, situated primarily in the west, and the agrarian eastern provinces, and, on the other hand, the tension between the ‘particularist’ interests of the Prussian monarchy and the ever-increasing momentum of the Empire as a nation-state. In terms of foreign policy, the Empire was the last of the major European nations to begin acquiring colonies in the 1880s, and under Wilhelm II (1859–1941) pursued the so-called ‘Weltpolitik’, which was intended to secure Germany’s equal standing with Great Britain, Russia, France and the USA. The conservative policy of balance cultivated by Bismarck to isolate France lost its effectiveness after 1890, as Russia and Britain felt a growing rivalry with the young Empire. Consequently, a Franco-Russian alliance formed, whilst Germany found itself confined to the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 left Germany strategically ‘encircled’, a situation it sought to counter by forming a strategic axis via Bulgaria into the Ottoman Empire (‘Berlin–Baghdadrailway”) via Bulgaria.

The immediate trigger for the First World War was the escalation of the Austro-Serbian conflict, which was underpinned by the Austro-Russian rivalry – the Achilles’ heel of the German security system. In 1914, the German Empire’s war aims consisted solely of the strategic defeat of its adversaries and the securing of its global position. With the exception of German East Africa, its colonies were occupied by the warring powers after a short time. In Europe, by contrast, German troops occupied vast areas belonging to various enemies – in the west, parts of Belgium and France; in the east, parts of Russia (primarily Russian Poland and the Baltic states); and, in cooperation with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, parts of Italy as well as the whole of Serbia and Romania. Some of these territories were envisaged as future German spheres of influence in the various war aims plans under discussion at the time; however, proposals for direct annexation concerned only small, economically significant regions such as the iron ore mines of Longwy and Briey in French Lorraine. In the east, large parts of East Prussia were occupied by Russian troops in 1914–15; this led to numerous killings and deportations of German civilians, as well as the destruction of many towns. However, the Russian troops were driven back here in 1915, just as they were in Austrian Galicia. In the wake of this strategic advance eastwards and Tsar Nicholas II’s (Nikolai II, 1868–1918) refusal to agree to a separate peace, the concept of the ‘peripheral states’ or ‘secession’ policy emerged in 1916; this was intended to create a zone of influence and a buffer zone comprising states allied with Germany along Russia’s border regions, where the ethnic majority was non-Russian (as part of the ‘Central Europe’ concept). As a preliminary step towards this, in 1915 the so-called ‘Land Ober Ost’ (i.e. the area of command of the Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern Front) was established in 1915 as – in theory – a model state administered with military efficiency, in which methods of economic, transport-related and administrative ‘civilisation’ were tested in this region, which was considered backward from a Western European perspective. The proclamation of the ‘Kingdom of Poland’on 5 November 1916 was intended to mark the beginning of the establishment of the aforementioned belt of client states. However, there was no formal annexation of enemy territory, either here or elsewhere; consequently, various proposals for the annexation of Congress Poland territory (the ‘border strip plan’) were never put into practice. Despite these successes in the east and Russia’s withdrawal from the war, the material superiority and better geostrategic position of the Western Powers, as well as the collapse of the Allies in 1918, led to the German defeat.

The Weimar Republic (1918–1933)

The failure of the military and civilian leadership, which became apparent in the wake of the retreat in the West from September/October 1918, the extremely strained supply situation and the war weariness of many soldiers and civilians led, on 3 October, to the sailors’ strike in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel and to the subsequent nationwide revolution, initially taking the form of the establishment of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. In this situation, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party (split since 1917 into the MSPD and the USPD) was regarded as the only force capable of channelling the events and preventing a civil war. Consequently, on 9 November, the last Imperial Chancellor, Max von Baden (1867–1929), ordered Wilhelm II to abdicate and transferred governmental authority to the MSPD chairman, Friedrich Ebert (1871–1925). On the same day, Philipp Scheidemann (1865–1939) proclaimed the German Republic, thereby pre-empting Karl Liebknecht (1871–1919), one of the leaders of the left-wing socialist Spartacus League, who had intended to establish a council republic. The struggle against the far left unexpectedly became the greatest challenge facing the provisional government, the Council of People’s Representatives, which it was only able to overcome through an alliance with the old elites of the German Empire, in particular the Supreme Army Command (the Ebert–Groener Pact), and the volunteer associations that had emerged following the armistice of 11 November 1918. This led – as in other European countries shaped by revolution – to a shifting of political allegiances and a conflict-ridden coexistence of pro- and anti-republican forces, exemplified by the so-called ‘flag dispute’ (black-red-gold versus black-white-red). The pro-republican parties – the SPD, DDP and the centre party – which formed the majority during the deliberations of the Weimar National Assembly in 1919–20 (the new constitution came into force on 14 August 1919), found themselves not only confronted with the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth propagated by the Right, which sought to reverse the causal relationship between the defeat and the revolution of 1918; but the Treaty of Versailles and Allied policy also placed a constant and heavy burden on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the ‘Weimar parties’.

On the grounds of Germany’s alleged sole responsibility for the war, the Reich was considerably weakened territorially, economically and militarily, and politically disadvantaged as a defeated power, which placed an undeniable burden on the ‘new order in Europe’ postulated by the Western powers. At the same time, the democratic forces in Germany – whose empowerment US President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) had expressly called for in October 1918, were treated no better than the old imperial elites; this undermined the credibility of the democratic orientation in the eyes of many citizens and weakened the standing of the Weimar Republic. The reparations obligations and the loss of territory, particularly to Poland in the east, as well as the Reich’s virtual military defencelessness, led to bitterness and a sense of threat; as a result, the desire for a revision of the borders became a demand on all sides. However, for the pro-republican parties, this was conceivable only by peaceful means, whilst the radical right, at least rhetorically, did not rule out a new war. Following a series of crises – the Kapp–Lüttwitz Putsch of 1920, the political assassinations of Matthias Erzberger (1875–1921) and Walther Rathenau (1867–1922), hyperinflation, communist uprisings and the Hitler Putsch of 1923, and the occupation of the Ruhr – the economic and political situation began to stabilise from 1924 onwards, allowing the Weimar parties and the Republic a period of recovery (‘Golden Years’). In terms of foreign policy, this phase was characterised by the policies of Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929), which were geared towards restoring German equal standing on the international stage. Black Friday on 25 October 1929 brought about the collapse of the post-1918 reconstruction of the European economy, which had been financed primarily by American loans. The presidential cabinets appointed following the end of the last parliamentary government in March 1930 pursued a policy of austerity, which led to millions of people becoming unemployed. Against this backdrop, the NSDAP secured 18.3 per cent of the vote in the Reichstag elections of 14 September 1930, compared with just 2.6 per cent in the 1928 elections. To a lesser extent, the KPD also gained votes, whilst the SPD—which nevertheless remained the strongest party—and the traditional right-wing parties, the DNVP and the DVP, suffered losses. Whilst, in the aftermath, sections of the DNVP and other right-wing forces openly allied themselves with the NSDAP, the KPD, at the behest of Stalin (1878–1953), had been waging a campaign since 1931 directed against the Republic and, above all, against social democracy. The next Reichstag election on 31 July 1932 saw the NSDAP achieve its best result in free elections, with 37.3 per cent; however, as it refused to form a parliamentary government, the ‘Cabinet of the Barons’ under Franz von Papen (1879–1969) was unable to secure a majority. Following an agreement with Hitler, elections were held again in November 1932; although the NSDAP suffered slight losses, the centrist parties were also further weakened. The attempt by the new Chancellor, Kurt von Schleicher (1882–1934), to harness the energy of the Nazi movement by forming a cross-party alliance, thereby bypassing Hitler, failed. Following Schleicher’s resignation, Hitler was appointed Chancellor of a coalition comprising the NSDAP and the DNVP on 30 January 1933; this effectively marked the end of the Weimar Republic.

Nazi rule (1933–1945)

The Nazi leadership quickly succeeded in neutralising its conservative coalition partners, undermining the separation of powers and initiating political and ideological standardisation across all areas of public life. In this process, the intimidation of political opponents by the SA and SS played just as much a part as the widespread disillusionment with the parliamentary system, hopes for economic recovery, and the genuine enthusiasm of many Germans for Hitler’s tough and (initially) successful stance towards the guarantor powers of the Treaty of Versailles and its onerous provisions. In the early stages, political pressure (including violence) was directed primarily at political opponents such as Social Democrats and Communists, but also at Liberals and Conservatives, who were deported to the first concentration camps for the purpose of ‘political re-education’. The decisive formal prerequisite for this was the ‘Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and the State’, issued on 28 February 1933, which suspended key fundamental rights and was prompted by the Reichstag fire of the previous day, the causes of which have never been fully clarified. Following the death of Reich President Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) in August 1934, Hitler merged that office with his own under the title ‘Führer and Reich Chancellor’; from then on, he formed the supreme leadership of all state and party organisations within the context of the emerging ‘polycracy’. In doing so, the ‘state of measures’ – corresponding to the National Socialist concept of dynamism – co-existed alongside the institutional state, which continued to exist in formal terms, as Hitler entrusted state-like tasks to high-ranking Nazi representatives or party organisations. The most significant manifestation of this form of rule was the highly autonomous ‘Imperium’ of the SS under Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945) and Reinhard Heydrich (1904–1942), whose headquarters from 1939 onwards was the ‘Reich Security Main Office’ (RSHA) on Prinz-Albrecht-Straße in Berlin. The SS also became the principal agent in the displacement, persecution and murder – initially carried out in a somewhat restrained or covert manner from 1933 onwards, but later in an increasingly aggressive fashion – of population groups classified as ‘unfit for life’ or ‘racially alien’. Although the Jews, as the largest group of victims, were still able to organise themselves officially within the Reich until around 1942/43, they had already been gradually excluded from professional life and public spaces from 1933 onwards. In addition to professional bans, exclusion campaigns and restrictions on freedom of movement, numerous Jewish businesses were ‘Aryanised’. Until 1938, these measures were primarily aimed at forcing German (and Austrian) Jews to emigrate; this culminated in ‘Reichskristallnacht’ (now also known as ‘Reichspogromnacht’, ‘Pogromnacht’, ‘November pogroms’) on 9 November 1938, when numerous synagogues and other Jewish institutions were destroyed and many Jews were arrested. With the outbreak of war in September 1939, most escape routes were cut off for Jews and other threatened groups; starting from Poland (the General Government and annexed territories), the construction of the extensive networkof camps and ghettosbegan across occupied Europe, initially serving to spatially isolate and economically exploit Jewish and other prisoners. Later, particularly during ‘Operation Reinhardt’ from July 1942 onwards, transports to the extermination camps located in the General Government were organised from here or using these structures.

This policy of extermination, directed against various social and ethnic groups, could only be implemented through the use of military force. The occupied countries were treated very differently in accordance with the Nazis’ own ‘racial hierarchy’; generally speaking, those in the west and north were treated better than those in eastern and south-eastern Europe. Hitler’s primary territorial objective was to subdue the Soviet Union, destroy the Bolshevik regime there and secure for Germany – or rather for the never precisely defined ‘Aryan race’ – an empire based on the Eurasian landmass (Russia as ‘German India’). In doing so, he identified Bolshevism as a system of rule established by Jews, which consequently led to plans for the physical extermination of the Jews in Europe. Similarly, after Hitler’s attempt to form an alliance with the ‘kindred’ states of the West had failed, Great Britain and the USA in particular were portrayed as being under Jewish control. This primarily ideological justification made the escalation of the struggle envisaged by Hitler into a new world war seem inevitable. This came to pass in 1941 with the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June and the declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the USA on 11 December, followed in January 1942 by the Wannsee Conference as its ‘internal counterpart’. Through this military escalation, the Axis powers overstretched their strategic capabilities and jeopardised the successes achieved in 1939–40; much as in the First World War, the Allied powers’ vastly superior resources (particularly those of the USA) were bound to lead to the defeat of the Axis as the war dragged on. Despite many operational successes in 1941–1942, they failed to eliminate the Soviet Union or Britain; with the defeat of the 6th Army at Stalingrad and the setbacks in Africa, the Axis found itself on the strategic defensive in 1943. Despite, or perhaps precisely because of, the looming defeat, the industrial-scale murder of the Jews reached its peak in 1943–44. From January 1945, the Allies gradually occupied the Reich territory in the face of fierce resistance. On 30 April, Hitler committed suicide in the Führer’s bunker; on 7 and 8 May respectively (9 May according to Moscow time), the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht was signed in Reims and Berlin-Karlshorst. Following the arrest on 23 May of the last Reich government, based in Flensburg and led by Karl Dönitz (1891–1980), the Allies assumed governing authority in Germany under the Berlin Declaration of 5 June; thereby suspending Germany’s sovereignty for an indefinite period. In the post-war decades, and in the wake of the establishment of the Federal Republic and the GDR, a debate arose as to whether the German Reich continued to exist and which German state could claim to be its legal successor. In its judgement of 31 July 1973 on the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic and the GDR (signed on 21 December 1972), the Federal Constitutional Court held that, whilst the German Reich had been organisationally divided into two states in 1949, it continued to exist under international law. Whilst the Federal Republic ’s constitutional authority was limited to the scope of the Basic Law, it nevertheless felt responsible for the whole of Germany. The GDR was part of Germany and could not be regarded as a foreign country in relation to the Federal Republic. For a long time after 1949, the SED leadership had, for its part, pursued the goal of reunification and regarded the GDR as the historically legitimate core of the nation-state to be re-established. From the 1970s onwards – particularly since the Basic Treaty – it had, however, come to regard the Federal Republic as a foreign state and categorically rejected the idea of the GDR’s legal succession to or legal identity with the Reich. German reunification and the Two-Plus-Four Treaty of 1990 finally resolved the question of the right to represent the whole of Germany.

4. Bibliographical references

Bibliography

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Periodicals

  • Historical Journal
  • Quarterly Journal of Contemporary History
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  • Tel Aviv Yearbook of German History
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Web links

Citation

Jens Boysen: Germany/German Empire. In: Online Encyclopaedia on the Culture and History of Germans in Eastern Europe, 2020. URL: ome-lexikon.uni-oldenburg.de/p32614 (as at 5 October 2020).

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